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Abstract
The convergence of law is a widely discussed and researched phenomenon. In company law the con-
vergence problemacy has often been linked to the so-called Americanization of law which is under-
stood as a phenomenon where foreign law is influenced by American (state or federal) law. Quite
often this topic has been approached from a “macro” perspective which leaves some of the research
findings somewhat abstract and general. Therefore, in this article, the Americanization of European
company law has been analyzed utilizing a “micro” perspective. The purpose is to illustrate how and
why European company law has been influenced by American corporate law by using the Finnish
Limited Liability Companies Act as an example.
1 Introduction
The convergence of law is a multidimensional and widely researched phenomenon. There are many
ways to define what the convergence of law means. For example, Andrei Y. Mordovcev, Tatyana V.
Mordovceva and Aleksey Y. Mamychev have claimed that
[t]he convergence of law is [a] polivector process of rapprochement and interpenetra-
tion of the individual components of different national legal systems on the basis of the
global socio-cultural, political and economic factors, the universal legal principles and
standards, as well as the specifics of their implementation in domestic legal relations,
the result of which is the  internationalization and harmonization of the legal regula-
tion of public relations.2
1 The author is the vice-dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Helsinki. This article has been presented at the
European Consortium for Political Research’s General Conference held in Prague 7.–10.9.2016.
2 Mordovcev, Andrei Y., Mordovceva, Tatyana V. & Mamychev, Aleksey Y.: The Convergence of Law: The Diversity
of Discourses. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 2015 pp. 262–267, p. 266.
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This is, of course, only one way to explain what the convergence of law is, and as Ugo Mattei and
Luca G. Pes have demonstrated, convergence is such a complex phenomenon that it cannot be encap-
sulated by a single definition.3 Moreover, the mechanisms of legal convergence are numerous.4
The convergence of law is a consequence of globalization.5 As Hans-Ueli Vogt has aptly observed,
the “characteristics of the globalization of the law facilitate and foster certain patterns of change,
which, in turn, foster convergence.”6 Unlike its counterpart – divergence – the convergence of law is
often perceived as positive international development,7 although legal scholars sometimes “fall into
the classic trap” of thinking that convergence is a value in and of itself.8 From an economic perspec-
tive, the convergence of law may, of course, reduce transaction costs and facilitate international com-
merce, yet one should keep in mind that uniformity in law should never become an end in itself.9
In jurisprudence the convergence of law has been often analyzed as a transatlantic phenomenon, in
which case legal scholars tend to use such concepts as the Americanization and Europeanization of
law. Although transatlantic legal convergence is usually understood as European law becoming more
American – or the other way around – the Americanization of law has sometimes been associated
with the federalization of U.S. law and respectively the Europeanization of law with the shift of law-
making authority from the Member States to the EU.10 In other words, some legal scholars have
approached the Americanization and Europeanization of law as an intra-American or intra-European
subject. It is therefore necessary to clarify what one means when discussing the Americanization or
Europeanization of law.
3 Mattei, Ugo & Pes, Luca G: Civil Law and Common Law: Toward convergence? In Celdeira, Gregory A., Keleman, R.
Daniel &Whittington, Keith E. (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics. Oxford University Press 2008 pp. 267–
280, pp. 268–271. See also Chirico, Filomena &Larouche, Pierre, who separate the convergence of law from harmoniza-
tion and the unification of law. Chirico, Filomena &Larouche, Pierre. Convergence and Divergence, In Law and Eco-
nomics and Comparative Law. In Larouche, Pierre & Cserne, Péter (eds.): National Legal Systems and Globalization.
New Role, Continuing Relevance. TMC Asser Press / Springer 2013 pp. 9–33, p. 12.
4 See, e.g., Vogt, Hans-Ueli: Convergence in Corporate Governance in Light of Globalization. A Presentation Given at
the International Conference on Law and Society in the 21st Century, Berlin 2007 pp. 5–8.
5 From a company law perspective, see, e.g., Gilson, Ronald J.: Globalizing corporate governance: convergence of form
or function. In Gordon, Jeffrey N. & Roe, Mark J. (eds.): Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance. Cam-
bridge University Press 2004 pp. 128–160, pp. 128–137 and Vogt 2007.
66 Vogt 2007 p. 5.
7 See, e.g., the Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on A Modern Regulatory Framework for Com-
pany Law in Europe (2002, later “High Level Group 2002”) p. 72–73.
8 Chirico & Larouche 2013 p. 12 and 22.
9 Funken, Katja: The Best of Both Worlds – The Trend Towards Convergence of the Civil Law and the Common Law
System. Comparative Legal Essay 2003 (available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=476461) p. 5.
10 Bremann, George A.: Americanization and Europeanization of Law: Are There Cultural Aspects? Sesquicentennial
Essays of the Faculty of Columbia Law School 2008.
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In this article, the Americanization of law is understood as a phenomenon where foreign law (e.g. EU
law) is influenced by American (state or federal) law.11 This topic can be approached from a “macro”
perspective (e.g., how the so-called Sarbanes-Oxley Act has influenced the 8th company law di-
rective,12 or how American contract law has affected the culture of contracting in Europe) as well as
from a “micro” perspective (e.g., how the Delaware General Corporation Law – later “DGCL” – has
influenced the national laws of the EU Member States). Of these two approaches, here I utilize the
latter.
The purpose of this article is to illustrate how and why European company law has been influenced
by American (U.S.) corporate law by using the Finnish Limited Liability Companies Act (624/2006,
later the “FCA”) as an example. The FCA is a good subject for analysis, since Americanization has
been explicitly acknowledged in the preparatory materials of the law. In addition, Finnish company
law specialists have paid relatively much attention to the issue of convergence, and they have actively
participated in the discussion on the topic on both the national and international levels. Furthermore,
the FCA is a relatively new and – by European standards – modern law: One can argue that it is a
truly European company law.
Besides simply illustrating how and why the FCA became Americanized, some of the consequences
– i.e., the pros and cons – of this convergence shall also be briefly assessed. Here, one can easily
connect these consequences with several legal dilemmas which have received much attention in re-
cent international company law scholarship. Unfortunately, these issues cannot be discussed in detail.
2 Americanization of the FCA
Nordic companies acts (meaning the Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish acts) have a common
background, and before the 21st century they were substantially based on the so-called French-Ger-
manic juridical tradition.13 The first Finnish companies act dates back to 1895, and it was completely
11 In modern-day company law scholarship, the question of whether U.S. law has been influenced by European law is
usually ignored, while shareholder pressure and the power of the (Anglo-American) shareholder-oriented ideology have
been predicted to force legal changes in the direction of Anglo-American company and securities law. See, e.g., Hans-
mann, Henry & Kraakman, Reiner: The End of History for Corporate Law. Georgetown Law Journal 2001 pp. 439–468,
p. 455.
12 Eighth Council Directive 84/253/EEC of 10 April 1984 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on the approval of
persons responsible for carrying out the statutory audits of accounting documents.
13 In addition, Nordic companies acts have been subject to significant influence from the Anglo-Saxon tradition. Lekvall;
Per (ed.): The Nordic Corporate Governance Model. SNS Förlag 2013 p. 38.
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revised in 1978. The act of 1895 (Laki osakeyhtiöstä, 22/1895) was in many ways an imperfect law,
and in the late 1910s it was already considered outdated by global standards.14 The act of 1978
(Osakeyhtiölaki, 734/1978) was, in turn, a relatively modern and comprehensive law. It was prepared
on a Nordic level, which meant that it shared many similarities with other “second generation” Nordic
companies acts – although not as many as initially planned.15 The act of 1978 was built on a strict
state-interventionist model to secure the interests of the “welfareizing” nation, which meant that the
actions and duties of Finnish companies, shareholders and directors were regulated carefully.
In 1997, as a consequence of joining the EU, the act of 1978 was updated to meet the standards of
European company law. The implementation of EU law, however, fragmented and complicated Finn-
ish company legislation, and consequently the need to reconsider the fundamentals and details of
national law became inevitable. EU company law did not – and does not even today – form a com-
prehensive and consistent regulatory framework, which meant that Finnish legislators had rather wide
discretion on the principles and casuistic provisions of the new companies act.16 In addition, it is
important to remember that EU company law directives mainly concern public and/or listed compa-
nies, while the FCA applies to all limited liability companies – i.e., public and listed companies as
well as private companies – registered in accordance with Finnish law.17
The drafting of the new companies act began around the change of millennium, and right from the
beginning it seemed quite obvious that the law was to be founded on the Anglo-American law and
economics view of the company.18 According to this perspective, the purpose of a company is to
facilitate an economically efficient vehicle for business operations – i.e., minimize transaction costs.
Such values as competitiveness and flexibility (i.e., freedom of contract) were selected as the guiding
principles of the companies act, with the corporate friendly DGCL implicitly used as the model.19 On
14 Ehdotus uudeksi osakeyhtiölaiksi. Osakeyhtiölakikomitean mietintö ja Pohjoismaiset rinnakkaisehdotukset. KM 1969:
A 20 p. 45 (Official legal report concerning the Finnish Companies Act of 1978).
15 After lengthy negotiations between the Nordic countries, nearly identical bills were submitted to their legislatures, yet
the “appetite for Nordic economic co-ordination” had substantially weakened by this time. Lekvall 2013 p. 38.
16 However, in the European Commission's Action Plan on company law and corporate governance, adopted in December
2012, the need to codify European company law has been emphasized.
17 See FCA Chapter 1, Section 1.
18 See especially Osakeyhtiölain uudistaminen – Tavoitteena kilpailukykyisempi yhtiöoikeus. 21.8.2000 (memorandum
given by the Ministry of Justice, Finland concerning the FCA, later “Memorandum 2000”). See also Mähönen, Jukka &
Villa, Seppo: Osakeyhtiö I. Yleiset opit. WSOYpro 2006 p. 3.
19 See HE 109/2005 Eduskunnalle uudeksi osakeyhtiölainsäädännöksi (governmental bill concerning the FCA, later “HE
109/2005”) p. 16. See also Airaksinen, Manne: Onnistuiko vuoden 2006 osakeyhtiölakiuudistus? Defensor Legis 2013
pp. 443–460, pp. 444–445.
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an ideological level, this meant a huge leap from a “traditional” stakeholder-oriented regulatory
model towards a “modern” shareholder-oriented model.20
Now the key questions are why the traditional regulatory model was replaced by the Anglo-American
model and what the consequences of this replacement were. The first issue is addressed below and
the second is discussed later in Section 3.
When addressing the question of why the traditional regulatory model was replaced by the Anglo-
American model, it is first important to point out that Finland had suffered a deep economic recession
in the early 1990s. By the time the drafting of the FCA began (in the late 1990s, early 2000s) Finland’s
economy was, however, experiencing rapid growth, and consequently profitability, efficiency and
competitiveness had once again emerged as key priorities in politics and law-making.21 Moreover,
such factors as membership of the EU and the euro area, significant changes in Finland’s capital
markets (especially liberation from a bank-centered financial system) and new tax laws made it seem
inevitable that company law should be brought into the 21st century. Hence, the interests of Finnish
company law specialists turned towards the dynamic DGCL, which was considered supreme in terms
of economic efficiency22 – and Finland, of course, wanted to join the EU-wide regulatory competi-
tion23 known as the “race to the bottom (or top).”24
20 These models have been explained by, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman 2001 pp. 440–449.
21 It was, in fact, a conscious decision to draft and pass the bill concerning the FCA during a stable period in the Finnish
economy. Airaksinen 2013 p. 444.
22 See, e.g., Romano, Roberta: The Genius of American Corporate Law. The AEI Press 1993.
23 Although regulatory competition is usually associated with the phenomenon of U.S. states competing with one another
for the most business-attractive legislation, similar competition between the EU Member States has also occurred. Within
the EU regime, such competition in company law has been facilitated by the decisions of the European Court of Justice.
This race to the bottom/top has, however, not been as rigorous as the ongoing regulatory competition in the U.S. See, e.g.,
Armour, John, Hansmann, Henry &Kraakman, Reiner: What is Corporate Law? In Kraakman et.al. (eds.): The Anatomy
of Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional Approach. Second Edition. Oxford University Press 2009 pp. 1–34, p.
34 and Sjåfjell, Beate: Towards a Sustainable European Company Law. A Normative Analysis of the Objectives of EU
Law, with the Takeover Directive as a Test Case. Wolters Kluwer 2009 pp. 156–157 and pp. 258–262.
24 The race to the bottom is a phrase used to describe the deregulation of the business environment in order to attract
economic activities within the jurisdiction. In American company law, the race to the bottom has been seen as competition
among the states for a legal structure that benefits managers at the expense of shareholders. The concept of a race to the
top, on the other hand, has been used to describe competition for an efficient, shareholder-oriented regulatory framework.
Whether the so-called Delaware phenomenon (U.S. companies incorporating in the State of Delaware) is a race to the
bottom or a race to the top, is a much debated issue, and it cannot be addressed further here. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Stephen
M.: Corporation Law and Economics. Foundation Press 2002 pp. 14–16, who summarizes the ongoing discussion on the
phenomenon of the race to the bottom/top.
6
Another phenomenon which facilitated the Americanization of Finnish company law was the fact that
Finnish legal scholars were late-bloomers in law and economics.25 The golden days of law and eco-
nomics in Finland date back to the late 1990s and early 2000s, when prominent scholars published
several monographs and articles on the economic dimensions of company law. In fact, in 1994 Pro-
fessor Matti J. Sillanpää was the first Finnish scholar to defend a doctoral thesis which can be defined
(at least partially) as a law and economics study.26 Besides Sillanpää, Professors Jukka Mähönen and
Seppo Villa and Docents Timo Kaisanlahti and Pekka Timonen as well as the then Director of Leg-
islative Affairs, Manne Airaksinen, (today Attorney-at-law) were particularly important promoters of
the law and economics movement in Finland.
The impact of law and economics theory on Finnish company law doctrine was very strong. In fact,
alternative approaches were rather systematically ignored and eventually forgotten.27 Even the first
comprehensive study on the general principles of company law was built firmly on the law and eco-
nomics view of the company.28 Taking into account these factors – and the fact that jurisprudence has
always played an important role in Finnish lawmaking – it  was no surprise that the FCA was also
founded on a new ideology.29
Furthermore, it is likely that the fragmentation of the Nordic company law tradition played an im-
portant role in the Americanization of the FCA. This deterioration began after the failure to unify
Nordic companies acts in the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, the Europeanization of domestic com-
pany laws also loosened normative ties between the Nordic countries. Hence, on an ideological level,
the so-called path dependence effect did not prevent Finland from departing from the prevailing ju-
ridical tradition.30
25 However, the rest of Continental Europe has also been lagging behind the U.S. in terms of the development of law and
economics. See, e.g., Gelter, Martin & Grechenig, Kristoffel: History of Law and Economics. Preprints of the Max Planck
Institute for research on Collective Goods 2014/5.
26 Sillanpää, Matti J.: Julkisesta ostotarjouksesta. Arvopaperimarkkinaoikeudellinen tutkimus. Jyväskylä 1994.
27 E.g., Docent Heikki Toiviainen built his arguments on a “normative social theory”. See Toiviainen, Heikki: Osakeyh-
tiön toimitusjohtajan asema. Oikeusdogmaattinen tutkimus vallasta ja sen sääntelystä. Lakimiesliiton kustannus 1992.
This new approach was, however, rejected by other company law scholars.
28 Mähönen & Villa 2006. See also Timonen, Pekka: Määräysvalta, hinta ja markkinavoima. Julkisesti noteeratun yri-
tyksen määräysvallan siirtymisen oikeudellinen sääntely. Lakimiesliiton kustannus 1997 pp. 134–179.
29 See also The European Model Company Act (EMCA) 2015 pp. 11–12: “Over the last decade or two there has been a
paradigm shift in European company law. In short, the aim of company legislation/regulation has shifted from being
exclusively shareholder and creditor protection to including promotion of economic efficiency. The latter is reflected
primarily, but not exclusively, in the maximization of profits for shareholders. Use of economic theory and law and
economic studies have become a natural part of the development of company regulation particularly in the areas of cor-
porate governance, financing companies and takeovers.”
30 Also, e.g., Denmark has adjusted its company legislation to follow such trends as international regulatory competition,
economic efficiency and flexibility. See Krüger Andersen, Paul & Sørensen, Evelyne J.B.: The Danish Companies Act.
A Modern and Competitive European Law. Djøf Publishing 2013 p. 23.
7
3 Consequences of the Americanization of the FCA
When assessing the consequences of the Americanization of the FCA, one must start by making two
important observations. First, the ideological leap from a stakeholder-oriented regulatory model to-
wards a shareholder-oriented model did not result in the law being completely revised. Although the
FCA was built on a different regulatory model from its predecessor, many legal provisions remained
untouched or were merely updated to meet present day requirements. Second, it is important to em-
phasize that the consequences of the Americanization of the FCA – i.e., the pros and cons of the
convergence – are hard to test empirically, although empirical knowledge on this matter can be gained
by mere observation. In Finland this knowledge has been recently gathered by the Ministry of Jus-
tice,31 and also the Finnish Corporate Law Association has comprehensively assessed the strengths
and  weaknesses  of  the  FCA.32 Furthermore,  case  law concerning  the  FCA brings  out  some of  the
problems concerning legal transplants.
Maybe the most significant effect of the Americanization of the FCA was deregulation: On one hand,
the number of mandatory rules and formalities was decreased, and, on the other, the general principles
of company law were given more weight.33 In practice, this meant that the flexibility (i.e., freedom
of contract) of the law was increased to promote efficiency. Besides efficiency, the deregulation of
company law was supported by a strong belief in the sustainability of informal institutions in Finnish
society:34 If these institutions are strong and reliable, laws (i.e., formal institutions) do not have to be
as defensive (casuistic and mandatory) as in societies where informal institutions are weak and unre-
liable.35
31 See Osakeyhtiölain muutostarve. Arviomuistio 20/2016 (later “MOJ 20/2016”).
32 Kellas, Sebastian & Vesa, Rasinaho: Uuden osakeyhtiölain puutteita ja kehittämistarpeita. Tilintarkastus – Revision
05/2008 pp. 17–21.
33 HE 109/2005 p. 17.
34 See, e.g., North, Douglass C.: Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge 1990 p. 4 who
has separated “formal institutions” from “informal institutions.”
35 Villa, Seppo: Velkojan asema osakeyhtiössä. Talentum 2003 p. 23.
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Especially when the FCA came into force in 2006, some legal scholars believed that deregulation
would significantly erode the protection of the minority shareholders and creditors of Finnish com-
panies36 – although there has been no subsequent evidence that such deterioration has occurred.37 In
fact, the above mentioned data gathered by the Ministry of Justice show that today the majority of
legal practitioners and scholars would like the FCA to be even more liberal than is currently the case.
Especially in small and medium sized enterprises (later SMEs), the protection of minority sharehold-
ers and creditors is usually achieved by contractual arrangements – such as shareholders’ agreements
– thus the protection provided by the FCA is considered somewhat inconsequential.38 Nevertheless,
limited access to information on the actions of company directors has been recognized as an actual
fault in the legislation.39 Especially  in  SMEs and  in  companies  where  the  state  is  a  significant  or
majority shareholder (some of which have previously been public utilities), the law should provide
all shareholders with extensive information rights unless there is the risk of substantial harm to the
company.40
Deregulation has, of course, many disadvantages, and some Anglo-American transplants have been
met with skepticism by legal practitioners and scholars as well as entrepreneurs and investors. This
is illustrated by the following four examples:
1. The implementation of the strict shareholder-oriented model has attracted criticism.41 According
to Chapter 1, Section 5 of the FCA, “[t]he purpose of a company is to generate profits for the share-
holders, unless otherwise provided in the Articles of Association.” This so-called shareholder primacy
rule means that company directors should promote the interests of shareholders rather than those of
other stakeholders, such as creditors, employees and customers. Although supporters of the so-called
enlightened value maximization theory – which is the prevailing theory in Finland42 – claim that by
promoting the interests of the shareholders’ “going concern” the interests of other stakeholders are
36 See, e.g., af Schultén, Gerhard: Innehåller nya aktiebolagslagens stadganden för mycket dispositiva regel? Tidskrift
utgiven av Juridiska Föreningen i Finland 2006 pp. 309–318 and Toiviainen, Heikki: Suomen uusi osakeyhtiölaki:
Kilpailukykyinen osakeyhtiölainsäädäntö 2000-luvun yrityksille 1800-luvun sääntelyllä? In Kolehmainen, Esa (ed.): Bu-
siness Law Forum 2006. Helsinki 2006 pp. 25–67.
37 Airaksinen 2013 pp. 453–454.
38 See, e.g., FitzGeralf, Sean & Muth, Graham: Shareholders’ Agreements. Sixth Edition. Sweet & Maxwell 2012 pp. 27–
28.
39 Pönkä, Ville: Yhdenvertaisuus osakeyhtiössä. SanomaPro 2012 pp. 177–178.
40 Andersson, Jan: Minority shareholder protection in SMEs: a question of information ex post and bargaining power ex
ante? In Mette Neville & Engsig Sørensen, Karsten (eds.): Company Law and SMEs. Copenhagen 2010 pp. 191–206, pp.
192–193. See also MOJ 20/2016 pp. 29–30.
41 See, e.g., Toiviainen 2006.
42 Pönkä, Ville: Yhtiön etu – Osakeyhtiöoikeudellinen näkökulma I. Lakimies 1/2013 pp. 2–34.
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concurrently satisfied, there also seems to be a strong belief that company directors should have fi-
duciary duties to wider society rather than solely to their shareholders.43 Today, virtually all Western
jurisdictions provide entrepreneurs with the possibility of incorporating as non-profit, benefit or flex-
ible purpose companies, thus the essential question is whether the directors of “traditional” pro-profit
companies should prioritize (and to what extent) social benefit objectives over profitability.
At the end of the day, however, the shareholder-stakeholder primacy debate seems to be a topic to
which company law has little to contribute. As Michael C. Jensen states, a
[m]ultiple objective is no objective. It is logically impossible to maximize in more than
one dimension at the same time unless the dimensions are what are  known as “mono-
tonic transformations” of one another. … The result will be confusion and lack of pur-
pose that will fundamentally handicap the firm in its competition for survival.44
In other words, company directors must be provided with a specific objective, and the content of that
objective is a matter of politics not legal dogmatics. Therefore, the question of whether the share-
holder-oriented model is better than some alternative model is not addressed further here.
2. According to Chapter 1, Section 8 of the FCA, “[t]he management of the company shall act with
due care and promote the interests of the company.” In suits alleging that company directors have
violated this duty of care, courts evaluate the case according to a so-called business judgment rule
(liiketoimintapäätösperiaate). The business judgment rule holds that a court should not enjoin or set
aside a business decision made by a company’s directors or hold them liable for the damages caused
by such decision as long as an informed and rational basis for the decision can be demonstrated.45
This rule has evolved in Delaware court practice, and Finnish company law scholars claim that a
(nearly) identical rule exists in Finland.46
43 See, e.g., Sjåfjell, Beate & Mähönen, Jukka – Upgrading the Nordic Corporate Governance Model for Sustainable
Companies. European Company Law 11, no. 2 (2014) pp. 58–62, p. 59 – who have claimed that Nordic companies acts
should include the statement that “(t)he purpose of a company is to create sustainable value through the balancing of the
interests of its investors and other involved parties within the planetary boundaries”
44 Jensen, Michael C.: Value maximization, stakeholder theory and the corporate objective function. Journal of Applied
Corporate Finance 2001 pp. 8–21, pp. 10–11.
45 See, e.g., Johnston, E. Ashton: Defenders of the Corporate Bastion in Revlon Zone: Paramount Communications Inc.
v. Time Inc. Catholic University Law Review 1990 pp. 155–187, p. 155.
46 In fact, Mähönen and Villa as well as Dr. Marika Salo go even further and claim that U.S. law should be taken into
account when interpreting the Finnish version of the business judgment rule. Mähönen, Jukka & Villa, Seppo: Osakeyhtiö
I. Yleiset opit. Talentum 2015 p. 61 and Salo, Marika: Hyvä liiketoimintapäätös ja johdon vastuu. Talentum 2015 p. 43
and pp. 45–49. See also Krüger Andersen & Sørensen 2013 p. 213: In the USA, courts invoke the “business judgment
10
Stephen M. Bainbridge has argued that “the business judgment rule is designed to effect a compro-
mise – on a case-by-case basis – between two competing values: authority and accountability.”47 In
other words, the business judgment rule can be understood as a balance between the directors’ deci-
sion-making discretion and the need to hold directors responsible for their actions.48 The obvious
problem with this kind of a rule is that it does not really tell us anything about the degree of care and
skill shareholders are entitled to expect from their “agents”, i.e., company directors. In Finland, where
there is hardly any case law on director liability, shareholders are in an extremely vulnerable position
if their protection against managerial negligence and opportunism is based primarily on an “empty”
transplant-rule. Therefore, the adoption of the American (or Delawarean) business judgment rule can
be soundly criticized,49 especially given that it has also received substantial criticism in the U.S.50
3. Attitudes towards shareholder liability (i.e., shareholders being held personally liable for the un-
dertakings of the company) have traditionally been negative within Nordic regimes.51 In fact, before
2015 the principle of limited liability had never been breached in Finnish court practice. However, in
case KKO 2015:17, the Supreme Court of Finland found a Finnish listed company liable for the ac-
tions of its wholly owned Estonian subsidiary, which the parent company had used to evade obliga-
tions included in the Finnish Copy Right Act (404/1961). With this decision the Supreme Court
adopted the doctrine of piercing (or lifting) the corporate veil, which is a clear step towards the Anglo-
American company law tradition.52
rule” when assessing the conduct of directors and determining whether to impose liability in a particular case. … This
rule is widely recognized; also in Denmark.”
47 Bainbridge, Stephen M.: The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine. UCLA Research Paper No. 03-18 p. 2.
See also Bainbridge, Stephen M.: The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice. Oxford University Press 2008
pp. 107–108.
48 In addition, the business judgment rule has been seen as an “immunity doctrine” from the perspective company direc-
tors. McMillan, Lori: The Business Judgment Rule as an Immunity Doctrine. William & Mary Business Law Review 2013
pp. 521–574. See, similarly, Macey, Jonathan R.: Corporate Governance. Promises Kept, Promises Broken. Princeton
University Press 2008 p. 38.
49 It is, however, necessary to emphasize that Finnish legal scholars, at least, have not managed to create a better alterna-
tive to the Anglo-American business judgment rule. See especially Salo 2015.
50 See, e.g., Greenfield, Kent: The Failure of Corporate Law. Fundamental Flaws and Progressive Possibilities. The
University of Chicago Press 2006 p. 218 and Lyman, Johnson: The Unnecessary Business Judgment Rule. Columbia Law
School's Blog on Corporations and the Capital Markets 10.7.2013.
51 Pönkä 2012 pp. 28–30.
52 Although piercing the corporate veil is traditionally considered a “national problem,” the U.S. can be considered the
birthplace of veil-piercing jurisprudence. See, e.g., Vandekerckhove, Karen: Piercing the Corporate Veil. European Com-
pany Law 4:2007 pp. 191–200, p. 191. In other common law jurisdictions, such as the U.K., the doctrine of lifting the
veil plays a relatively small role. See, e.g., Davies, Paul L.: Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law.
Sweet & Maxwell 2008 pp. 208–209.
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Although the decision of the Supreme Court is soundly reasoned53 – it was evident that the respondent
had abused the protection of limited liability – it is both theoretically and practically problematic.54
First, according to Chapter 1, Section 2.2 of the FCA, “[t]he shareholders shall have no personal
liability for the obligations of the company.” Therefore, the Supreme Court’s decision is contra legem
and based  solely  on  an  unwritten  prohibition  against  the  abuse  of  rights.  Especially  in  a  civil  law
jurisdiction like Finland, it is highly exceptional for a court, even a supreme court, to form (or adopt)
legal rules which conflict with the explicit rules of written law: Finnish courts do not – and should
not – develop law in a similar manner to courts in a common law system (e.g., the Delaware Court of
Chancery).
Second, it is anything but self-evident that Finnish company law doctrine should provide the possi-
bility  of  piercing  the  corporate  veil.  Although there  are  situations  –  as  shown by  KKO 2015:17  –
where shareholders are capable of abusing the protection of limited liability, there are other mecha-
nisms which can be utilized to prevent such shareholder opportunism.55 As David Millon has demon-
strated, case law concerning the doctrine of veil-piercing is notoriously incoherent,56 and some have
even argued that the outcome of a trial “is dependent on the particular judge and what the judge has
had for breakfast!”57 In other words the possibility of piercing the corporate veil undermines legal
certainty in company law matters and opens the door to fraudulent suits – which is just what has
happened in the U.S. and the U.K. Therefore, the veil-piercing doctrine should thus be seen a Pan-
dora’s Box which should not be imprudently opened.58
4. Company law is based on the idea that since shareholders are the company’s residual risk bearers,
they are the most motivated of all the stakeholders to promote the company’s interests: Shareholders
only receive what is left after the claims of the other interest groups (creditors, employees, customers
etc.) have been satisfied. Therefore, the control rights of the company should be in the hands of share-
holders and the managers they have selected.59
53 See, e.g., Villa, Seppo: Samastaminen: KKO 2015:17. Lakimies 2016 pp. 533–542
54 MOJ 20/2016 p. 34.
55 Pönkä 2012 pp. 29–30.
56 Millon, David: Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the Limits of Limited Liability. Emory Law
Journal 2007, s. 1305–1382.
57 Bourne, Nicholas: Bourne on Company Law. 4th edition. Abingdon 2008 p. 17.
58 At least at present it seems that a veil-piercing statute will not be included in the FCA. MOJ 20/2016 p. 34.
59 See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman 2001 p. 441.
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A similar line of thought applies when determining how decision-making rights between shareholders
should be divided. The capitalistic nature of the company is crystallized in the presumption that the
person who invests the most capital should also have the most to say in company matters; i.e., instead
of utilizing the so-called one man, one vote principle, modern pro-profit companies utilize the one
share, one vote principle: The number of votes a shareholder possesses is determined by how many
shares she/he holds, unless otherwise stipulated in the articles of association.60
In EU company law, the connection between share capital and shares is currently unbreakable. Ac-
cording to Article 8 of the Second Company Law Directive,61 “[s]hares may not be issued at a price
lower than their nominal value, or, where there is no nominal value, their accountable par.” In other
words, public companies established within the EU regime may not issue shares with no reference to
either nominal value or fractional (“par”) value. Although the necessity for this rule is a highly de-
batable,62 it is nevertheless compulsory law for the EU Member States.
On the other hand, for decades U.S. states – beginning with the State of New York – have allowed
companies to issue “non-par value stock,”63 i.e., shares with no nominal or fractional value. Initially,
this caused some practical difficulties, but today problems related to non-par value shares are rela-
tively rare.64
Of these two models (the EU model and the U.S. model), Finland has adopted the latter, even though
it was acknowledged that the Second Company Law Directive does not permit non-nominal and non-
par value shares.65 In Finnish jurisprudence this regulatory decision has received some criticism, alt-
hough it has been simultaneously acknowledged that Finnish legislators have not compromised the
main objectives of the Second Company Law Directive by implementing the U.S. model.66 Foreign
60 In national legislation there are, of course, many exceptions to this principle. E.g., the FCA gives companies almost
limitless freedom to issue non-voting shares as well as multiple voting shares (FCA Chapter 3, Sections 3–4).
61 Second Council Directive (77/91/EC) of 13 December 1976 on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of
the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second
paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance
and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent.
62 See e.g., High Level Group 2002 p. 82–83.
63 See e.g., Airaksinen, Manne: Osakeyhtiölakityöryhmän aitoon nimellisarvottomuuteen perustuvaa pääomajärjestelmää
koskevat ehdotukset. Lakimies 2003 pp. 944–966, p. 963 and Berle, Adolf A. & Means, Gardiner C.: The Modern Cor-
poration and Private Property. 11th printing. New York 2010 p. 133. E.g., according to DGCL Section 152, shares to be
issued by a company “shall be paid in such form and in such manner as the board of directors shall determine. The board
of directors may authorize capital stock to be issued for consideration consisting of cash, any tangible or intangible prop-
erty or any benefit to the corporation, or any combination thereof.”
64 Clark, Robert Charles. Corporate Law. 12th printing. Aspen Law & Business 1986
65 Airaksinen 2003 pp. 964–965 and HE 109/2005 p. 22.
66 Laine, Juhani: Maksuton osake. Talentum 2016 p. 131 and 133.
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company law experts do not, however, regard this as an acceptable justification for the breach of the
explicit wording of Article 8.67 It  also seems that EU company law is not yet ready to take a step
towards the American model by discarding the futile requirements of nominal value and par value
shares.68 This does, of course, not mean that the European model is better than the alternative, and in
fact, Finnish experiences of the non-nominal and non-par value system have been mainly positive.69
Today it is, in fact, extremely rare for companies to provide shares with a nominal value in the com-
pany articles of association.
4 Final thoughts
In this article the so-called Americanization of European company law has been assessed from the
perspective of the FCA. As demonstrated above, there has been an ideological and normative shift
from the French-German company law tradition towards the Anglo-American tradition. Along with
this shift, Finland adopted several transplants from U.S. (or Delawarean) law, and in Section 3 it was
claimed that some of these transplants are – to say the least – problematic. However, during the past
ten years that the FCA has been in force, there have been no signs of a so-called “transplant-shock.”70
In fact, data gathered by the Ministry of Justice and the Finnish Corporate Law Association indicate
that the law has functioned relatively well.71 This, of course, does not mean that the current regulatory
framework for Finnish companies is perfect, and it remains to be seen, for example,  how the Anglo-
American business judgment rule and the veil-piercing doctrine will evolve in case law.
There is empirical evidence that, to some extent, most Western jurisdictions have adopted elements
of the “now-global norms of good corporate governance.”72 The question of the extent to which com-
pany law has converged (or should converge) – as well as the final form of that convergence – is
ultimately a subject on which “reasonable minds” can differ.73 Therefore,  it  is  impossible to make
precise predictions on the future evolution of European (and Finnish) company law. In Finnish juris-
prudence, Veikko Vahtera has argued that (company) regulation has a “local optimum,” and when
67 See, e.g., Sillanpää, Matti J.: European Model Companies Act – EMCA. Defensor Legis 2013 pp. 621–625, p. 625.
68 Ibid.
69 Airaksinen 2013 pp. 454–455.
70 Stout, Lynn A.: On the Export of U.S.-Style Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Other Cultures. In Milhaupt, Curtis J. (ed.):
Global Markets, Domestic Institutions. Corporate Law and Governance in a New Era of Cross-Border Deals. Columbia
University Press 2003 pp. 46–76, p. 47.
71 See also Airaksinen 2013 pp. 457–460.
72 See, e.g., Enriques, Luca, Hansmann, Henry & Kraakman, Reiner: The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of
Shareholders as a Class. In Kraakman et.al. (eds.): The Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional Ap-
proach. Second Edition. Oxford University Press 2009 pp. 55–87, p. 82.
73 Armour , Hansmann & Kraakman 2009 p. 5.
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this optimum is reached the process of convergence will come to an end.74 Taking into account such
projects as the European Model Company Act (EMCA), it seems likely that at least the convergence
of European company law will continue for the foreseeable future.
74 Vahtera, Veikko: Yhtiöoikeudellisen sääntelyn lokaalisuuden vaikutus sääntelyn pakottavuuteen ja sopimusvapauteen.
Lakimies 2/2010 pp. 160–175, p. 164.
